Opis

• Tytuł:
  There is Only One Mind/Body Problem
• Twórca:
  Harnad, Stevan
• Opis:
  In our century a Frege/Brentano wedge has gradually been driven into the mind/body problem so deeply that it appears to have split it into two: The problem of “qualia” and the problem of “intentionality.” Both problems use similar intuition pumps: For qualia, we imagine a robot that is indistinguishable from us in every objective respect, but it lacks subjective experiences; it is mindless. For intentionality, we again imagine a robot that is indistinguishable from us in every objective respect but its “thoughts” lack “aboutness”; they are meaningless. I will try to show that there is a way to re-unify the mind/body problem by grounding the “language of thought” (symbols) in our perceptual categorization capacity. The model is bottom-up and hybrid symbolic/nonsymbolic.
• Dostępność obiektu:
  Dostęp otwarty
• Prawa:
  Prawa autorskie (c) 2017 Theoria et Historia Scientiarum
• Data:
  2008.01.02
• Typ:
  info:eu-repo/semantics/article;
  info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
• Język:
  angielski
• Źródło:
  Theoria et Historia Scientiarum; Vol. 8 No. 1 (2008): Concepts, categories, and analogy; 5-16;
  Theoria et Historia Scientiarum; Tom 8 Nr 1 (2008): Concepts, categories, and analogy; 5-16;
  2392-1196;
  0867-4159
• Format:
  application/pdf
• Wydawca:
  Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
• Relacja: https://apcz.umk.pl/THS/article/view/ths.2008.001/13363
• Temat i słowa kluczowe:
  cognition;
  mind;
  body;
  consciousness;
  cognitive science;
  qualia
• Identyfikator: https://apcz.umk.pl/THS/article/view/ths.2008.001
• Dostawca danych:
  Akademicka Platforma Czasopism
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