Opis

• Tytuł:
  Quine and his critics on truth-functionality and extensionality
• Twórca:
  Sayward, Charles
• Opis:
  Quine argues that if sentences that are set theoretically equivalent are interchangeable salva veritate, then all transparent operators are truth-functional. Criticisms of this argument fail to take into account the conditional character of the conclusion. Quine also argues that, for any person P with minimal logical acuity, if ‘belief’ has a sense in which it is a transparent operator, then, in that sense of the word, P believes everything if P believes anything. The suggestion is made that he intends that result to show us that ‘believes’ has no transparent sense. Criticisms of this argument are either based on unwarranted assertions or on definitions of key terms that depart from Quine’s usage of those terms.
• Dostępność obiektu:
  Dostęp otwarty
• Prawa:
  Prawa autorskie (c) 2017 Logic and Logical Philosophy
• Data:
  2007.07.25
• Typ:
  info:eu-repo/semantics/article;
  info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
• Język:
  angielski
• Źródło:
  Logic and Logical Philosophy; Vol. 16 No. 1 (2007); 45-63;
  Logic and Logical Philosophy; Tom 16 Nr 1 (2007); 45-63;
  2300-9802;
  1425-3305
• Format:
  application/pdf
• Wydawca:
  Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu
• Relacja: https://apcz.umk.pl/LLP/article/view/LLP.2007.002/1467
• Temat i słowa kluczowe:
  Quine;
  Mackie;
  Sleigh;
  Sharvy;
  truth-functional;
  extensional
• Identyfikator: https://apcz.umk.pl/LLP/article/view/LLP.2007.002
• Dostawca danych:
  Akademicka Platforma Czasopism
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