Opis

• Tytuł:
  O zmyśle rzekomo wewnętrznym
• Twórca:
  Godlewski, Roman
• Opis:
  The paper recalls the thesis that the inner sense is, in fact, a sense like any other, but it gives very imprecise objectual information, as in the case of smell or taste. Considerations are carried out on the basis of a perceptual model of beings that are called “brainwatchers.” They can actually perceive every single atom of their bodies and brains. Also, they have all causal knowledge about the phenomena they perceive and they can gather the knowledge about single atoms into knowledge about macroscopic objects. Besides, they do not differ from normal human beings with the caveat that they do not have any of human external or inner experiences. The consequence of the fi rst thesis is refutation of the conviction that other persons’ brains are essentially unexplorable or hidden behind a barrier of subjectivity. Also, we reject the thesis that the physical description of the brain has to, necessarily, miss out the intentionality of mind. We also consider a view that consciousness is not of material but mathematical or computational kind and that human mind is divisible and continually changeable, but timeless at every moment, so it can be a starting point for an idea of immortality.
• Dostępność obiektu:
  Dostęp otwarty
• Prawa:
  Uznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne-Bez utworów zależnych 3.0 Polska;
  http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/pl
• Data:
  2014.12.08;
  2012
• Typ:
  Article
• Język:
  polski
• Format:
  application/pdf
• Wydawca:
  Bydgoskie Towarzystwo Naukowe
• Temat i słowa kluczowe:
  inner sense;
  perception;
  mind;
  other persons;
  communication;
  subjectivity;
  intentionality;
  consciousness;
  immortality
• Identyfikator:
  Filo-Sofija 2012, nr 1, No 16, s. 225-236;
  http://repozytorium.ukw.edu.pl/handle/item/1301
• Dostawca danych:
  Repozytorium Uniwersytetu Kazimierza Wielkiego w Bydgoszczy
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