Opis

• Tytuł:
  The Dismissal of ‘Substance’ and ‘Being’ in Peirce’s Regenerated Logic
• Twórca:
  Brioschi, Maria Regina
• Opis:
  After introducing the debate between substance philosophy and process philosophy, and clarifying the relevance of the category of ‘substance’ in Peirce’s thought, the present paper reconstructs the role of ‘substance’ and ‘being’ from Peirce’s early works to his theory of the proposition, provided after his studies on the logic of relatives. If those two categories apparently disappear in Peirce’s writings from the mid-1890s onwards, the account of ‘subject’ and ‘copula’ in Peirce’s analysis of the proposition allows one to grasp the reasons why Peirce omits ‘substance’ and ‘being’ in favor of his three categories (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness), and to understand why his philosophy cannot be considered as a substance philosophy.
• Dostępność obiektu:
  Dostęp otwarty
• Prawa: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0 ;
  Prawa autorskie (c) 2022 Maria Regina Brioschi
• Data:
  2022.08.08
• Typ:
  info:eu-repo/semantics/article;
  info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
• Język:
  angielski
• Źródło:
  Logic and Logical Philosophy; Vol. 32 No. 2 (2023): June; 217-242;
  Logic and Logical Philosophy; Tom 32 Nr 2 (2023): Czerwiec; 217-242;
  2300-9802;
  1425-3305
• Format:
  application/pdf
• Wydawca:
  Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu
• Relacja: https://apcz.umk.pl/LLP/article/view/35585/32928
• Temat i słowa kluczowe:
  Charles S. Peirce;
  logic of relatives;
  substance;
  being;
  process
• Identyfikator: https://apcz.umk.pl/LLP/article/view/35585
• Dostawca danych:
  Akademicka Platforma Czasopism
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