Opis

• Tytuł:
  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF HIRING FORMS DEDICATED TO MANAGERIAL POSITIONS IN POLAND
• Twórca:
  Lewkowicz, Jacek
• Opis:
  This paper deals with the economic analysis of hiring forms dedicated to managerial positions. Theoretical frames for corporate governance are based on agency theory. Crucial problems considered within agency theory are: information asymmetry, conflict of interests and supervision (monitoring) of management. Presented analysis covers also remuneration forms and manager’s participation in ownership. Theoretical underpinnings of this research supports the analysis of managers hiring methods available in Poland (managerial contracts and employment contracts) in order to point out the solution, which reduces agency costs to the greatest extent.
• Dostępność obiektu:
  Dostęp otwarty
• Prawa:
  Prawa autorskie (c) 2015 Ekonomia i Prawo. Economics and Law
• Data:
  2015.06.30
• Typ:
  info:eu-repo/semantics/article;
  info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
• Język:
  angielski
• Źródło:
  Ekonomia i Prawo. Economics and Law; Vol. 14 No. 2 (2015); 221-232;
  Ekonomia i Prawo. Economics and Law; Tom 14 Nr 2 (2015); 221-232;
  2392-1625;
  1898-2255
• Format:
  application/pdf
• Wydawca:
  Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu
• Relacja: https://apcz.umk.pl/EiP/article/view/EiP.2015.013/6815
• Temat i słowa kluczowe:
  agency theory;
  information asymmetry;
  conflict of interest;
  supervision;
  employment contract;
  law and economics
• Identyfikator: https://apcz.umk.pl/EiP/article/view/EiP.2015.013
• Dostawca danych:
  Akademicka Platforma Czasopism
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