Description

• Title:
  Fixed points, Nash games and their organizations
• Creator:
  Abalo, Kokou Y.;
  Kostreva, Michael M.
• Description:
  The concepts of $(S, \sigma)$-invariance and $(S, \sigma, R, M)$-invariance are introduced and are used to prove two existence theorems of equilibrium in the sense of Berge [2] and Nash [1, 2] using fixed point arguments. Radjef's results [8] have been extended. Conditions under which these equilibria are Nash are also shown. Assuming that each player's strategy set is a subset of a reflexive Banach space and that the strategies can be partitioned in such a way that the argmax of each player's objective over an element of the considered partition is unique and satisfies one of the invariance properties, equilibria exist. Similar results are obtained for games with an infinite number of players.
• Object availability:
  free access
• Rights:
  Prawa autorskie (c) 2017 Topological Methods in Nonlinear Analysis
• Date:
  1996.09.01
• Type:
  info:eu-repo/semantics/article;
  info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion;
  Recenzowany artykuł
• Language:
  English
• Source:
  Topological Methods in Nonlinear Analysis; Vol 8, No 1 (September 1996); 205 - 215;
  1230-3429
• Publisher:
  Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
• Relation: https://apcz.umk.pl/TMNA/article/view/TMNA.1996.029/11692
• Subject:
  Berge equilibrium;
  Nash equilibrium;
  game organization;
  reflexive Banach spaces;
  existence of solutions;
  invariance;
  90D06;
  90D10;
  90D13
• Identifier: https://apcz.umk.pl/TMNA/article/view/TMNA.1996.029
• Data provider:
  Akademicka Platforma Czasopism
• Can I use it?:
  seek permission
• Type:
  other