Description

• Title:
  Bycie – nie bycie, prawda – fałsz w koncepcji Arystotelesa
• Creator:
  Wesoły, Marian Andrzej
• Description:
  The basis of Aristotle’s arguments about truth and falsity is formulated syntactically according to the distinctions of ‘to be’ as the predicative affirmation - composition and, correspondingly, ‘not to be’ as negation – separation. As the nominal defining characteristic of falsity is contradic­tion, so of truth is non-contradiction. The expression of truth or falsity in the declarative sentence of affirmation or negation is a function of thinking as a human cognitive disposition under the semantic figures of categorical predication. In addition, we cite Aristotle’s more important texts on the true intellection of non-composites (indivisibles), the inves­tigation of truth and probability, the diagnosis of falsehood, the truthful­ness and lying. Finally, a mention of modern adaptations of Aristotle’s concept of truth.
• Object availability:
  free access
• Rights:
  Prawa autorskie (c) 2021 Marian Andrzej Wesoły
• Date:
  2021.12.13
• Type:
  info:eu-repo/semantics/article;
  info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion;
  Articles;
  Artykuł naukowy
• Language:
  English
• Source:
  Peitho. Examina Antiqua; Vol. 12 No. 1 (2021); 171–196;
  Peitho. Examina Antiqua; Tom 12 Nr 1 (2021); 171–196;
  2082-7539
• Format:
  application/pdf
• Publisher:
  Adam Mickiewicz University Poznan
• Relation: http://pressto.amu.edu.pl/index.php/peitho/article/view/30469/27949
• Subject:
  Aristotle;
  Being – Not-Being;
  Categorical predication;
  Falsity as Contradiction;
  Truth as non-contradiction;
  Philosophy as investigation of truth;
  Truthfulness and Lying
• Identifier: http://pressto.amu.edu.pl/index.php/peitho/article/view/30469
• Data provider:
  Platforma Otwartych Czasopism Naukowych UAM
• Can I use it?:
  seek permission
• Type:
  text