Description

• Title:
  Hintikka and Cresswell on logical omniscience
• Creator:
  Jago, Mark
• Description:
  I discuss three ways of responding to the logical omniscience problems faced by traditional ‘possible worlds’ epistemic logics. Two of these responses were put forward by Hintikka and the third by Cresswell; all three have been influential in the literature on epistemic logic. I show that both of Hintikka’s responses fail and present some problems for Cresswell’s. Although Cresswell’s approach can be amended to avoid certain unpalatable consequences, the resulting formal framework collapses to a sentential model of knowledge, which defenders of the ‘possible worlds’ approach are frequently critical of.
• Object availability:
  free access
• Rights:
  Prawa autorskie (c) 2017 Logic and Logical Philosophy
• Date:
  2007.03.15
• Type:
  info:eu-repo/semantics/article;
  info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
• Language:
  English
• Source:
  Logic and Logical Philosophy; Vol. 15 No. 4 (2006); 325-354;
  Logic and Logical Philosophy; Tom 15 Nr 4 (2006); 325-354;
  2300-9802;
  1425-3305
• Format:
  application/pdf
• Publisher:
  Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu
• Relation: https://apcz.umk.pl/LLP/article/view/LLP.2006.019/1496
• Subject:
  logical omniscience;
  epistemic logic;
  nonclassical logics
• Identifier: https://apcz.umk.pl/LLP/article/view/LLP.2006.019
• Data provider:
  Akademicka Platforma Czasopism
• Can I use it?:
  seek permission
• Type:
  text