Description

• Title:
  Mereology and truth-making
• Creator:
  Simons, Peter
• Description:
  Many mereological propositions are true contingently, so we are entitled to ask why they are true. One frequently given type of answer to such questions evokes truth-makers, that is, entities in virtue of whose existence the propositions in question are true. However, even without endorsing the extreme view that all contingent propositions have truth-makers, it turns out to be puzzlingly hard to provide intuitively convincing candidate truth-makers for even a core class of basic mereological propositions. Part of the problem is that the relation of part to whole is ontologically intimate in a way reminiscent of identity. Such intimacy bespeaks a formal or internal relation, which typically requires no truth-makers beyond its terms. But truth-makers are held to necessitate their truths, so whence the contingency when A is part of B but need not be, or B need not have A as part? This paper addresses and attempts to disentangle the conundrum.
• Object availability:
  free access
• Rights:
  Prawa autorskie (c) 2017 Logic and Logical Philosophy
• Date:
  2015.10.29
• Type:
  info:eu-repo/semantics/article;
  info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
• Language:
  English
• Source:
  Logic and Logical Philosophy; Vol. 25 No. 3 (2016): September; 245-258;
  Logic and Logical Philosophy; Tom 25 Nr 3 (2016): wrzesień; 245-258;
  2300-9802;
  1425-3305
• Format:
  application/pdf
• Publisher:
  Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu
• Relation: https://apcz.umk.pl/LLP/article/view/LLP.2015.020/7181
• Subject:
  mereology;
  mereological propositions;
  truth-makers;
  continuants
• Identifier: https://apcz.umk.pl/LLP/article/view/LLP.2015.020
• Data provider:
  Akademicka Platforma Czasopism
• Can I use it?:
  seek permission
• Type:
  text