Description

• Title:
  Self-reference and the divorce between meaning and truth
• Creator:
  Tsohatzidis, Savas L.
• Description:
  This paper argues that a certain type of self-referential sentence falsifies the widespread assumption that a declarative sentence’s meaning is identical to its truth condition. It then argues that this problem cannot be assimilated to certain other problems that the assumption in question is independently known to face.
• Object availability:
  free access
• Rights:
  Prawa autorskie (c) 2017 Logic and Logical Philosophy
• Date:
  2013.09.03
• Type:
  info:eu-repo/semantics/article;
  info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
• Language:
  English
• Source:
  Logic and Logical Philosophy; Vol. 22 No. 4 (2013): December; 445-452;
  Logic and Logical Philosophy; Tom 22 Nr 4 (2013): December; 445-452;
  2300-9802;
  1425-3305
• Format:
  application/pdf
• Publisher:
  Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu
• Relation: https://apcz.umk.pl/LLP/article/view/LLP.2013.025/1860
• Subject:
  self-reference;
  truth-theories;
  meaning-theories;
  compositionality;
  natural language semantics
• Identifier: https://apcz.umk.pl/LLP/article/view/LLP.2013.025
• Data provider:
  Akademicka Platforma Czasopism
• Can I use it?:
  seek permission
• Type:
  text