Description

• Title:
  A Fregean conception of singular existence
• Creator:
  Sayward, Charles
• Description:
  A perplexity about singular existence statements (for example, ‘Socrates exists’) is that for their negations to be true their subject terms do not name anything. For example, in ‘Pegasus does not exist’ ‘does not exist’ is not said in respect to the referent of ‘Pegasus’ since there is none. But, then, in respect to what is that said? The paper answers the question by proposing a metalinguistic interpretation of singular existence statements, according to which singular existence statements are about names. It is argued that this interpretation fits in well with Frege’s views on existence, presupposition, and his idea that names have senses. 
• Object availability:
  free access
• Rights:
  Prawa autorskie (c) 2017 Logic and Logical Philosophy
• Date:
  2014.03.28
• Type:
  info:eu-repo/semantics/article;
  info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
• Language:
  English
• Source:
  Logic and Logical Philosophy; Vol. 24 No. 1 (2015): March; 3-18;
  Logic and Logical Philosophy; Tom 24 Nr 1 (2015): March; 3-18;
  2300-9802;
  1425-3305
• Format:
  application/pdf
• Publisher:
  Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu
• Relation: https://apcz.umk.pl/LLP/article/view/LLP.2014.006/3150
• Subject:
  Frege;
  Kant;
  Hume;
  Descartes;
  singular existence statements;
  names;
  free logic;
  classical logic
• Identifier: https://apcz.umk.pl/LLP/article/view/LLP.2014.006
• Data provider:
  Akademicka Platforma Czasopism
• Can I use it?:
  seek permission
• Type:
  text